Electoral Systems and Corruption

Authors

  • Vincenzo Verardi ECARES, CEPLAG

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35319/lajed.20043303

Keywords:

Electoral Systems, Corruption

Abstract

Recently, many scholars have tried to explain how electoral systems are linked to corruption Several theories emerged but still no consensus has been reached. With a dataset of about 50 democratic countries considered over 10 years we try to understand which of the effects highlighted in the theoretical literature domínales. The results tend to show that larger voting districts (characterized by lower barriers to entry) are assoclated with less corruption. Whereas closed lists tend to be associated with more. The latter effect is nevertheless not robust. In aggregate. We find that majoritarian systems tend to be associated to higher levels of corruption than proportional representations. An additional finding is that presidential regimes tend to be associated with more corruption than parliamentary ones.

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Author Biography

Vincenzo Verardi, ECARES, CEPLAG

ECARES: European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics, Brussels, Belgium.
CEPLAG: Centro de Planificación y Gestión , Cochabamba, Bolivia .

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Published

2004-10-01

How to Cite

Verardi, V. (2004). Electoral Systems and Corruption. Latin American Journal of Economic Development, 2(3), 117–150. https://doi.org/10.35319/lajed.20043303