Sistemas electorales y corrupción
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35319/lajed.20043303Palabras clave:
Sistemas Electorales, CorrupciónResumen
Últimamente, muchos estudiosos han tratado de explicar cómo los sistemas electorales se relacionan con la corrupción. Varias teorías surgieron, pero todavía no se ha lo grado un consenso al respecto. En este estudio, con datos correspondientes a 50 países democráticos, considerados a lo largo de 10 años, intentamos comprender cuáles fueron los efectos dominantes más sobresalientes de acuerdo a la literatura teórica. Los resultados tienden a mostrar que los distritos electorales más grandes (caracterizados por menores barreras a la entrada) están asociados a una menor corrupción, mientras que las listas electorales pequeñas tienden a asociarse a mayores niveles de corrupción. Sin embargo, el ultimo efecto no es robusto. En suma, encontramos que los sistemas mayoritarios tienden a estar asociados con mayores niveles de corrupción que las representaciones proporcionales. Adicionalmente encontramos que los regímenes presidencialistas tienden a estar asociados con mayores niveles de corrupción que en regímenes parlamentarios.
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