Instituciones políticas y colapsos de crecimiento
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35319/lajed.20042318Palabras clave:
Manejo de conflictos, Choques económicos, RecuperaciónResumen
Este documento evalúa si los resultados de Rodrik (1999) de que las instituciones para el manejo de conflictos están asociadas con la capacidad de reaccionar ante los choques económicos son robustos a diferentes formas de definir la calidad de tales instituciones. En este documento, medimos la calidad de las instituciones de gestión de conflictos con dos índices diferentes. El primero es un índice de restricciones políticas sobre la capacidad del ejecutivo para imponer su voluntad. Estas restricciones limitan la capacidad del gobierno para cambiar arbitrariamente las reglas del juego y, por lo tanto, pueden reducir las luchas redistributivas. El segundo índice mide el grado de particularismo político. Definimos el particularismo político como la capacidad de los formuladores de políticas para avanzar en su carrera al atender intereses limitados en lugar de plataformas nacionales más amplias. Los índices utilizados en este documento resuelven los sesgos de endogeneidad y subjetividad que afectan la principal medida de calidad institucional de Rodrik. Encontramos un fuerte apoyo a la idea de que los altos niveles de restricciones políticas y los niveles intermedios de particularismo político están asociados con una rápida recuperación de las crisis económicas.
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