

# What Separates Bolivians From Each Other? A Survey Experiment of the Effects of Social Identities on Trust and Affection

¿Qué separa a los bolivianos?  
Un estudio experimental de los efectos de las identidades sociales en la confianza y el afecto

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## Abstract

This study examines the impact of historical and ascriptive social identities –such as ethnicity, region, and socioeconomic status– alongside newly formed partisan identities in Bolivia, using a behavioral survey experiment to measure trust and bias. Findings indicate that partisanship has emerged as a super-identity, consolidating various old unresolved cleavages and generating significantly stronger antagonism toward those with opposing voting preferences. On a one-to-ten scale, out-group bias among Incumbent and Opposition voters ranges from 0.90 to 1.73, compared to a statistically insignificant ethnic bias and a moderate regional bias of 0.55. Socioeconomic bias is also evident, with poorer groups exhibiting a 0.46 bias toward wealthier individuals. These results underscore the role of partisanship in amplifying historical divides.

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We also studied how behavioral measures compare to self-report measures of affection, and our results show that traditional measures of affection display more fragmentation and polarization than behavioral measures. Importantly, we find no significant differences across identity groups in policy attitudes on issues such as democracy, property rights, welfare, gay marriage, or abortion, suggesting that partisan divides may stem more from a sense of being included or excluded by the group than from ideological disagreement.

**Keywords:** Social identities, Partisanship, Trust and bias, Political polarization, Behavioral experiment.

## Resumen

Este estudio examina el impacto de las identidades sociales históricas y adscriptivas –como la etnia, la región y el estatus socioeconómico– junto con las identidades partidistas de reciente formación en Bolivia, utilizando un experimento de encuesta conductual para medir la confianza y el sesgo. Los resultados indican que el partidismo ha surgido como una superidentidad, consolidando varias viejas divisiones no resueltas y generando un antagonismo significativamente mayor hacia quienes tienen preferencias de voto opuestas. En una escala de uno a diez, el sesgo hacia grupos externos entre los votantes del partido en el poder y los de la oposición oscila entre 0.90 y 1.73, frente a un sesgo étnico estadísticamente insignificante y un sesgo regional moderado de 0.55. El sesgo socioeconómico también es evidente, ya que los grupos más pobres muestran un sesgo de 0.46 hacia los más ricos. Estos resultados subrayan el papel del partidismo en la amplificación de las divisiones históricas.

También estudiamos cómo se comparan las medidas de comportamiento con las medidas de autoinforme del afecto, y nuestros resultados muestran que las medidas tradicionales de afecto muestran más fragmentación y polarización que las medidas de comportamiento. Es importante destacar que no encontramos diferencias significativas entre los grupos de identidad en las actitudes políticas sobre cuestiones como la democracia, los derechos de propiedad, el bienestar, el matrimonio homosexual o el aborto, lo que sugiere que las divisiones partidistas pueden deberse más a un sentimiento de ser incluido o excluido por el grupo que a un desacuerdo ideológico.

**Palabras clave:** Identidades sociales; afiliación partidista; confianza y sesgo; polarización política; experimento conductual.

**Classification/Clasificación JEL:** D71, D72, Z13, D63, J15, C93, H10

## 1. Introduction

Political polarization is becoming a growing problem in societies worldwide, whether developed or developing. For a long time, political polarization was thought to be limited to political elites, with most people holding moderate political views and having difficulty defining themselves ideologically. Even strong partisans often have a mix of views, with extreme opinions on some issues and moderate ones on others. While differences do exist on specific issues, scholars believe that political polarization does not accurately describe the views of the majority of the public in most societies.

Recently, there has been a noticeable rise in hostility and partisanship among people worldwide. This trend is not limited to the United States, where the divide between Republicans and Democrats has become increasingly pronounced. Similar divisions have emerged in countries like India, Venezuela, and Bolivia, where people identify as Nationalists, Seculars, Chavistas, Masistas, or Pititas, depending on their political leanings. Rather than being driven by ideology or policy issues, this polarization is fueled by partisanship, which has become a new social identity. Terms like Republican, Chavista, or Masista are used to differentiate between “us” and “them”. This partisan animus does not require complete agreement on values and policy attitudes. It needs a sense of inclusion and exclusion that drives people to favor their group and discriminate against others (Brewer, 2001).

This paper distinguishes between the issue-based and identity-based factors contributing to political polarization. To achieve this, a behavioral survey experiment was conducted to investigate how these factors create social distance between partisan identities and historical divisions based on ethnicity, place of birth/residency, and income class. Bolivia was chosen as a case study due to its long social cleavages and divided history. These range from the traditional ascriptive social identities based on race, ethnicity, language, and culture to non-ascriptive but historical identities based on urban/rural, regional (east vs. west), and class divides. Understanding the roots of social polarization is crucial in finding solutions to severe

political polarization. It helps determine whether social antagonism is based on old social cleavages, such as ethnic, class, regional divides, or new partisan identities, or whether the partisan animus is based on polarizing opinions and world views.

The following paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we present our analytical framework, which discusses issue-based polarization and both new and old forms of identity-based polarization, analyzing their affective and social effects. In Section 3, we present alternative measures of ideological and affective polarization, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each. Section 4 describes our survey experiment and interprets the results. In Section 5, we conclude by discussing the severe crisis of polarization and its possible consequences. Finally, the annex at the end contains supporting material, background information, and a timeline of political events in Bolivia in the 21st century.

## **2. Trust, affection and political polarization**

### **2.1. Social sorting**

Social identity theory states that people's identities are a mixture of how they see themselves and their societal place. People are natural sorters; they tend to find categories that connect them to some people and differentiate them from other people. In these comparison and identification processes, they almost always favor their group (in-group favoritism) and discriminate against the other groups (out-group bias) (Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979). On the one hand, the success of intra-group cooperation has given us democracy and civil rights, and it is the darkness of inter-group conflict that has given us genocide and war (Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 2015).

Social identity (Tajfel, 1970; 1974) is "part of an individual's self-concept derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) and the value and emotional significance attached to that membership". Therefore, a social group comprises individuals who perceive themselves as members of the same social category and share the same social identity. Societies are divided by different social identities, some "old" and dated as far as the emergence of the re-formation of the nation-state, some much more recent. Ascriptive identities are those groupings that a person is usually born into and maintains through life, such as race, ethnicity, linguistic, and religious groups. Non-ascriptive divisions, such as those

between different regions -city dwellers and rural inhabitants, or between socioeconomic classes- such as the poor, the middle, and the affluent classes. Regardless of the nature of the divisions involved, antagonism between groups is expected to be amplified when “old” social identities align with relatively “new” political divisions by ethnicity, region, or class. Political camps will appear even more homogeneous and distinct, fostering negative out-group affect and behavior (Mason & Wronski, 2018; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).

It is a classic insight that cross-cutting cleavages decrease social tensions (Lipset, 1960). Mason (2016; 2018) and Mason and Wronski (2018) demonstrate that Americans with aligned religious, racial, and partisan identities are more antagonistic towards partisan out-groups, regardless of the extremity of their views.

When politically like-minded individuals in any society also tend to share nonpolitical identities, i.e., when people are socially sorted along political lines, then partisanship becomes a super-identity. This super-identity concentrates on various unresolved cleavages and causes even more antagonistic feelings towards those with opposing views. Differences between parties become battle lines on many social identity fronts. When a mix of old social fissures reinforces the division along political lines, we end up with severely polarized societies where party affiliation becomes core cleavage. Irreconcilable opposing camps with similar social identity characteristics characterize severe polarization. Being part of one group or another becomes not only about voting a certain way or preferring a specific set of policies but also about being a given kind of person with particular social values and belonging to a specific set of social identities. The tribal nature of group dynamics means that members of a group become fiercely loyal to their group, wanting it to win at all costs, and strongly biased and prejudiced against the other group.

Severe affective polarization translates partisans’ views into rooted social identities that become competing, irreconcilable worldviews. It installs polarization in minds and hearts. The opposite side is regarded as illegitimate, and compromise is immoral. When divisions become too intense, they become destructive. Disagreement over a set of policy issues becomes irrelevant. The division is predominantly justified by group affiliation. I disagree because I am different from you. I am different from you becomes I do not like you, and I don’t like you can quickly become I hate you. Affective polarization can quickly escalate stereotyping and

view politics as a zero-sum game. Your group has to win; the other has to lose. Politics became tribal. Tribal thinking among competing groups in a society leads to the inability to process different points of view and to accept contrary facts.

In Bolivia and Latin America, the high levels of exclusion and inequality of opportunity, income, and wealth may have created deep divisions and fertile ground for profound ideological identities and partisanship super-identities. The latter may align historical cross-cutting cleavages, strengthening the power of this new social identity and its effects. Whether politics in LAC have become a clash between social identities, not a clash over policy frameworks, is, to the best of our knowledge, an open question. Whether Chavistas in Venezuela, Bolsonaroistas in Brazil, Kirchneristas in Argentina, Masistas in Bolivia, Fujimoristas in Peru, are new social identities that have drifted apart from their counterpart, not only because of ideological differences but even instead of ideology, overriding whatever commonalities existed between them so that there is very little common ground between each other.

## **2.2. Ideological polarization**

Political polarization has been defined and measured as the extent to which positions are opposed. Ideological polarization is the process that reduces disagreement on critical issues within a party and increases disagreement with other parties. This type of political polarization is not necessarily a bad thing. Conflict is intrinsic to the very nature of society. There are, and will always be, disagreements about points of view, interests, and philosophies. It is good that societies have political alternatives so citizens use democracy to make their choices. Democracy is a political system designed to contain conflicting views on several issues.

In the U.S., issues focus primarily on economic aspects usually defined by the poles of the left-right spectrum, such as the conservative vs. liberal approaches to the economy, such as the size of government, the level of taxes, or clashing socio-cultural outlooks involving traditional vs. modern cultural values such as LGBT rights, abortion, and immigration. In LAC, in general, and in Bolivia, in particular, issues focus on the general orientation of the economy, such as pro-market/pro-state, property rights over natural resources, and participatory vs. representative democratic models. In other countries, issues may be related to religious vs. secularist, globalist/cosmopolitan versus nationalist approaches to a government organization.

## **Ideological sorting**

Ideological sorting occurs when people are more congruent with their ideology and party affiliation. It increases inter-party differences not because the average position has moved to an extreme but because of the increased similarity of views within a party (intra-party homogeneity). Through ideological sorting, people within a party start to look more and more like each other, making party identification more salient. People in parties have views that match their fellow partisans and are very different from those in the opposing party.

Ideological sorting can happen at different levels, such as the political elite, activists, or the masses. Research shows that people with higher political knowledge are far more likely to align their party identification and ideology. The direction of the process is not clear. Are people bringing ideology in line to match party identification? Or are they changing their party identification to match ideology? Some evidence from the U.S. points to realignment probably driving party switching, but other evidence suggests people are becoming more aware of expected ideology and adjusting to that.

### **2.3. Affective political polarization**

Affective political polarization originates in the individual's identification with a political group or party. Identifying with a particular party divides the world into a liked in-group (one's party) and an out-group (the opposing party). According to social identity theory, this division may cause individuals to view their fellow co-partisans positively and the opposing partisans negatively (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Instead of ideology -sometimes, despite ideology, people's political views get wrapped up in positive evaluations of their party and negative evaluations of the other party. In such a situation, politics becomes a zero-sum, where one group has to win, and the other has to lose, *i.e.*, if the other side is winning, you must be losing. Severe polarization across political identities may lead to greater mistrust and animosity between parties. Severe political polarization can give rise to the use of negative views and stereotyping in the evaluation of the out-group; tendencies to view one's party as moderate and the Opposition as extreme; views of the economy as dependent upon only the party in power; rejection of compromise; and even Opposition to inter-party marriage. Suppose people within parties become and look more similar. In that case, the party becomes a lens through which people process new information, which may trigger motivated

reasoning -the evaluation of new information such that it reinforces pre-existing views. In such a situation, political elites have less pressure to moderate. With fewer moderates in the party and less pressure from their electorate, they can pursue more extreme policies.

### **3. Measurement**

Scholars have used three main approaches to measure in-group and out-group bias (a.k.a., within-group favoritism and between-group discrimination): behavioral measures of interpersonal trust allocations; survey self-reports of affection (or closeness) toward other social groups and partisans; and implicit or subconscious bias tests against other social groups and partisans.

#### **3.1. Behavioral measures of trust**

Extensive literature in various fields, like psychology, political science, economics, and sociology, measures trust by examining how individuals behave in a game called the trust game (also known as the investment game) (see Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). Participants in this game are given a sum of money and can choose to give some, all, or none of it to another player. Both players are informed that any amount given to the second player will be tripled in the second stage. In the first stage, Player 1 has two choices. They can either play it safe and earn a guaranteed amount by not engaging with the other player or take a risk and potentially earn a much more significant sum, but only if the second player behaves cooperatively. In the final stage, the second player can voluntarily return some, all, or none of the money to Player 1. While both players have the opportunity to act opportunistically, they will both benefit more if they cooperate. The more Player 1 allocates to Player 2, the more Player 1 trusts Player 2, *i.e.*, the more Player 1 is willing to make himself vulnerable to Player 2's actions (Fehr, 2009).

The literature suggests that contrary to rational behavior, Player 1 usually allocates significant amounts to Player 2, and this allocation varies depending on Player 1's attributes and Player 2's group affiliation (Johnson & Mislin, 2011; Wilson & Eckel, 2011; Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001; Fong & Luttmer, 2011). Previous research has shown that Player 1 may exhibit slight favoritism towards co-partisans Fowler and Kam (2007). Furthermore, Westwood et al. (2015) finds that party affiliation, as a form of group identity, overshadows other prominent



social cleavages in developed countries, such as the White-Black divide in the U.S., the Christian-Muslim divide in the U.K., the Flemish-Walloon in Belgium, or the Basque-Spanish divide in Spain. Regardless of their differences in political and electoral institutions or levels of social discord, party affiliation tends to polarize individuals more than other social cleavages.

Behavioral games have been used extensively to assess group cooperation and conflict measured in terms of willingness to invest money in individuals with varied group affiliations (e.g., Berg *et al.*, 1995; Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2007). We use a classical trust game to measure trust allocations between in-group and out-group social identities and compare them with trust allocations between in-group and out-group partisan identities.

Partisanship represents the dominant divide and the most substantial basis for group polarization. Carlin and Love (2013) and Iyengar and Westwood (2015) use economic games to measure the extent to which party members are willing to donate or withhold financial rewards from those with whom they do or do not share a party affiliation. Using the trust game, they measure partisan bias as the difference between financial allocations to co-partisans and opposing partisans. The U.S. results show that co-partisans consistently receive a bonus while opposing partisans are subject to a financial penalty. Westwood *et al.* (2015) analyze Great Britain, the United States, Belgium, and Spain and find partisan divisions overshadow those ethnic, regional, and socioeconomic class cleavages.

Experiments offer two primary benefits when measuring in-group and out-group bias. Firstly, individuals stand to lose money if they place their trust in untrustworthy individuals or fail to trust trustworthy ones. Therefore, these experiments incentivize behaviors. Secondly, the experiments are highly controlled to ensure that only predetermined stimuli can influence people's attitudes toward trust and trustworthy behavior. Behavioral games have been conducted in various settings, such as classrooms, computer laboratories, online, and household surveys.

### **Partisan cues in nonpolitical settings**

Some research suggests that partisanship cues have bled into the nonpolitical sphere, driving ordinary citizens to reward co-partisans and penalize opposing partisans in other spheres. This

phenomenon of affective externalities has been documented in a variety of domains, including evaluations of job applicants (Gift & Gift, 2015), dating behavior (Huber & Malhotra, 2017), and online labor markets (McConnell, Margalit, Malhotra, & Levendusky, 2018).

Regardless of the measurement technique, the literature consistently documents an affective and behavioral divide between the in-party and the out-party. Lelkes and Westwood (2017) show that while affective polarization predicts political and private behavior, it has yet to rise to overt discrimination as conceptualized in social psychology.

How individuals respond to alternative social identification treatments in classic behavioral experiments related to altruism, trust, and public good contribution. Individuals with partisan affiliations display stronger affective polarization than unaffiliated independents.

Tribalism, the bias favoring in-groups over out-groups, is often seen as a mechanism to enhance group fitness and prospects for survival in the face of threats. While in-group bonding may increase social cohesion, it can lead to conflict with out-groups.

Cross-national evidence suggests that psychological attachment to partisan identity could be even more salient than race, religion, or ethnicity (Westwood et al., 2018), raising concerns about rising affective polarization. Researchers also examine possible convergence between partisan identity and ideological orientation (Hetherington & Weiler, 2018; Malka *et al.*, 2019).

Measures of implicit attitudes are weak predictors of relevant behaviors. The limitations of the attitudinal approach have led scholars to study behavioral manifestations of partisan animus in experimental settings.

### **3.2. Survey Self-Reports**

Researchers usually evaluate the fondness or hostility towards social groups by conducting surveys requiring individuals to report their own feelings. The most commonly used question to measure this is the feeling thermometer rating. This question asks respondents to rate how warmly or coldly they feel towards their social group and those they perceive as outsiders. Respondents are generally asked to rate political parties or supporters on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the coldest and 100 being the warmest. To calculate affective polarization, the

difference between the rating given to the respondent's party and the rating given to the out-party is measured (Lelkes & Westwood, 2017, Iyengar *et al.*, 2019). The feeling thermometer rating is widely used in surveys to measure the impact on various groups.

In addition to the commonly used "feeling thermometer" survey item, scholars have also used other measures to study affective discord in politics; for instance, Levendusky and colleagues have used trait ratings of party supporters to measure affective discord. These ratings ask whether supporters are intelligent, open-minded, generous, hypocritical, selfish, and mean. Another measure Levendusky uses is counting the number of things people can recall that they like and dislike about the parties, which can be considered a quasi-behavioral measure. Other studies, such as those by Garrett *et al.* (2014) and Iyengar (2012), have also used similar measures to explore affective discord.

Other scholars have substituted "affection" questions for less obtrusive measures of social distance, which refers to the degree to which individuals feel comfortable interacting with members of a different group in various situations. They measure how close people are willing to get to those from the other group. For instance, they assess how comfortable people are in having close friends and neighbors or allowing their children to marry someone from another group. If social identity or partisanship is crucial, individuals will be less likely to form close interpersonal relationships with other group members. For instance, a study by Iyengar (2012) found that Americans are becoming increasingly averse to their children marrying someone from the opposite political party.

Klar *et al.* (2018) conducted a study that found that people's aversion towards different political parties often leads to social distance measures. This means that they perceive the political affiliation of others as an essential part of their identity. For instance, they disapproved when asked whether they would allow their child to marry someone from the opposite party. However, their disapproval decreased when they were informed that the potential spouse was apolitical. Similarly, their disapproval of marriages between the same parties increased when they were told that the other person discussed politics a lot. This suggests that some of the Opposition to inter-party marriage and other types of social distance measures stems from the assumption that people labeled as Republicans and Democrats are more likely to be extremists, as portrayed by the media (Levendusky, 2016) than their more typically

apolitical counterparts. It also reflects the link between politics and disagreement, as most prefer consensual relationships (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016). Klar *et al.* (2018) criticize the lack of explanation regarding why social distance measures change over time unless there is an increase in the desire for political agreement. If such an increase occurs, it also indicates a rise in emotional polarization. Therefore, it is crucial to comprehend the exact limits of social distance measures.

It is essential to point out that prior studies provide little insight into how self-reported measures of affective polarization relate to behavioral trust allocations. Most studies either include only one or do not explicitly compare them. Notice that thermometers and trust measures are general attitudes about broad objects (i.e., social identities or political parties). The relation between general attitudes and specific behaviors tends to be very low (Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). On the other hand, social distance measures capture attitudes about particular behavioral outcomes (e.g., your child marrying someone from another party). Therefore, social distance measures are expected to be only marginally related to the first two.

## **4. What separates Bolivians from each other?**

### **4.1. A survey experiment**

To examine whether political polarization is more divisive than historical and social divides in Bolivia, we utilized a sample of nearly 1,000 participants who completed the study in December/January 2022. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, participants took part in an online survey and behavioral experiments. Although internet-based sampling was less common in the past, it is now recognized as a viable and effective method for experimental designs, providing several advantages over traditional sampling techniques. Among the primary benefits is the ability to access a larger and more diverse population spanning various demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic backgrounds, which can enhance the external validity of the findings.

Unlike in-person or lab-based experiments, internet sampling allows researchers to reach participants across different regions and contexts, reducing the logistical and financial constraints typically associated with recruitment and data collection. Additionally, internet

sampling can provide a more naturalistic setting for participants, as they can complete experiments from the comfort of their own environments, potentially leading to more authentic responses. Moreover, modern online platforms enable the use of advanced randomization techniques and can facilitate real-time data collection with high levels of automation, minimizing experimenter bias. Despite some concerns about data quality and participant engagement, online sampling platforms have developed robust tools to screen for inattentive respondents, thereby ensuring the integrity of the experimental results. Given these advantages, internet sampling has become a practical and powerful tool for researchers seeking to conduct experiments efficiently while reaching a broad and varied sample (Krantz & Reips, 2017).

Participants self-selected to join the survey experiment, which was advertised through targeted ads on all Meta platforms, which was deployed using a o-tree based web app. Leveraging Meta's targeting capabilities, we focused on individuals aged 20 years or older, primarily from La Paz and Santa Cruz. These two regions ultimately represent nearly 70% of the sample; on top of that, we make sure we included more than 30 observations from each other region, with Beni and Pando counted together as a single region. The only selection criterion controlled for was age, ensuring all participants were legally eligible to vote in the 2019 elections at the time of the survey.

During the experiment, they decided how to allocate ten lottery tickets for a one thousand US dollar prize between themselves and another player randomly identified with similar or opposite social/ political identities. Each participant completed a randomly ordered set of five trust game scenarios (a between-subjects design). To avoid order effects and feedback-based allocations, each participant only played as Player 1. Participants were told they would learn of Player 2's allocations at the end of the games. Participants were informed at the end of the experiments (see the annex, supporting materials, and instructions at the end for more information). We investigate the importance of three historical, social identities, and recent political identities: 1) Ethnicity (Indigenous vs. Non- indigenous); 2) Region (East vs. West); 3) Income strata (Haves vs. Have-nots); and 4) Political affiliation (Incumbent vs. Opposition).

## 4.2. Social identities, partisanship, and trust

Our central hypothesis is that more salient, as observed in many other contexts, the social and partisan division will exhibit the standard group polarization, i.e., in-group trust allocation will be higher than out-group trust allocations. We would like to test whether historical and social identities, based on ethnicity, region, and income strata divide, generate more significant trust premiums or prejudice penalties than more recent political identities. In a country such as Bolivia, where historical social cleavage runs deep and has provoked prolonged political conflict, we expect that polarization based on ethnic, regional, and income class affiliation will rival polarization based on partisanship. Kolmogorov Smirnov balance tests indicate the randomization successfully balanced subjects across treatment groups for each experiment. Sample sizes, demographic summary statistics, and balance tables are discussed in the technical annex at the end of the document.

### 4.2.1. Ethnic divides

*Indigenous vs. Non-indigenous.* Bolivia is a multiethnic society with many dynamic ethnic markers related to territoriality, language, clothing, and race. To simplify things, we classify subjects into two broad groups: indigenous and non-indigenous. We define subjects' ethnicity using three alternative markers: 1) Heritage, which defines whether the subject or a direct family member (parent or grandparent) belongs to an indigenous community; 2) Spoken language, that defines whether the subject or a direct family member (parent or grandparents) speaks an indigenous language; and 3) Self-identification, which defines whether the subject identifies himself as indigenous.


*Stimuli.* Ethnicity was induced by revealing paternal and maternal last names with clear indigenous or non-indigenous (Spanish) origin. Player 2's last names were randomly chosen between two alternatives.

- Mamani Quispe (Indigenous origin).
- Vargas Martinez (Non-indigenous/Spanish origin).

*Results.* Figure 1 presents mean trust allocations by ethnic identity to in-group and out-group members. Panel (a) defines ethnicity by heritage, Panel (b) defines ethnicity by spoken language, and Panel (c) defines ethnicity by self-identification. By Heritage, non-indigenous

were most generous toward other non-indigenous (mean=US\$ 5.6, s.e. [0.2]), and least generous with indigenous (mean=US\$ 5.2, s.e. [0.2]). In contrast, indigenous were as trusting of their fellow co-ethnics (mean=US\$ 5.2, s.e. [0.2]), as of non-indigenous (mean= US\$ 5.1, s.e. [0.2]). By language, non-indigenous were most generous toward other non-indigenous (mean=US\$ 5.6, s.e. [0.3]), and least generous with indigenous (mean=US\$ 4.8, s.e. [0.2]). In contrast, indigenous were as trusting of their fellow co-ethnics (mean=US\$ 5.4, s.e. [0.2]), as of non-indigenous (mean=US\$ 5.3, s.e. [0.2]). Finally, by self-identification, non-indigenous were most generous toward other non-indigenous (mean=US\$ 5.3, s.e. [0.3]), and least generous with indigenous (mean=US\$ 4.9, s.e. [0.2]). In contrast, indigenous were as trusting of their fellow co-ethnics (mean=US\$ 5.4, s.e. [0.2]), as of non-indigenous (mean=US\$ 5.4, s.e. [0.2]).

**Figure 1: Trust allocations by ethnic identity**



Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean allocations, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group allocations. Identification by heritage classifies a person as indigenous if they or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community. Identification is based on whether the participant speaks an indigenous language or not.

Table 1 presents estimates of the in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination effects by ethnic identity. For every definition, we present three sets of results: Equation (1) presents estimates of the average in-group and out-group effects between subjects without including covariates; equation (2) presents estimates of the average in-group and out-group effects between subjects, including controls by age and sex; equation (3) present estimates of the average in-group and out-group effects relative to the control experiment -i.e., the increase or decrease in trust allocation relative to the baseline experiment that groups people based on preferred color.

Only out-group penalty toward indigenous is statistically significant when subjects are classified based on their heritage. Non-indigenous imposed a penalty of .80 when interacting with their indigenous counterparts. However, the penalty became statistically insignificant when estimates were evaluated relative to the control experiment.

#### 4.2.2. Regional divides

*East vs. West.* Beyond the indigenous divide, Bolivia exhibits regional divides, especially between territories in the lowlands/East -and their associated social identity “collas” and regions of the high- lands/West -and their related identities “cambas”). To keep things simple, we use three alternative definitions of lowland/East and highland/West identities: 1) Born and resident in the department of Santa Cruz (East) or La Paz (West); 2) Born and resident in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija in the lowlands/West and all other departments in the highlands/East; and 3) Self-identification with the Western social identity “Colla” or with the Eastern social identity “Camba”<sup>1</sup>.

*Region stimuli.* To avoid temporary birth and temporary residency problems, we induce a regional identity by combining both places of birth and place of residency. Player 2’s categories were randomly chosen between two alternatives.

- Born and resident in the department of La Paz and living in the city of La Paz.
- Born and resident in the department of Santa Cruz and living in the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

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
<sup>1</sup> As we will see in the survey analysis, neither all people born and residing in the lowlands/East identifies themselves as “cambas,” nor all the people born and residing in the lowlands/East identifies themselves as “collas”.



*Results.* Figure 2 presents mean trust allocations by regional identity to in-group and out-group members. Panel (a) analyzes differences between the people residing in La Paz (West) and Santa Cruz (East); Panel (B) analyzes differences between people residing in the highlands (West) and people in the lowlands (East); and Panel (c) analyzes differences by self-identification, between those who identify as “Collas” (West) and those who identify as “Cambas” (East). Defined by a residency in either the departments of La Paz or Santa Cruz, westerners were almost as trusting of their fellow co-regionals (mean=US\$ 5.6, s.e. [0.3]), as toward easterners (mean=US\$ 5.5, s.e. [0.2]). Easterners behaved similarly; they were as generous toward their fellow co-regionals (mean=US\$ 5.4, 95% s.e. [0.3]), as towards westerners (mean=US\$ 5.4, 95% s.e. [0.3]). Defined by a residency in departments of the highlands, westerners were almost as trusting of their fellow co-regionals (mean=US\$ 5.6, s.e. [0.3]), as toward easterners (mean=US\$ 5.5, s.e. [0.2]). Easterners behaved similarly; they were as generous toward their fellow co-regionals (mean=US\$ 5.4, 95% s.e. [0.2]), as towards westerners (mean=US\$ 5.4, 95% s.e. [0.2]). Defined by a residency in either the departments of La Paz or Santa Cruz, westerners were almost as trusting of their fellow co-regionals (mean=US\$ 5.3, s.e. [0.2]), as toward easterners (mean= US\$ 5.5, s.e. [0.2]). Easterners behaved similarly; they were as generous toward their fellow co-regionals (mean=US\$ 5.4, 95% s.e.[0.3]), as towards westerners (mean=US\$ 5.4, 95% s.e. [0.3]). Finally, defined by self-identification, westerners were more trusting of their fellow co-regionals (mean=US\$ 5.6, s.e. [0.2]), as toward easterners (mean= US\$ 5.0, s.e. [0.4]). Easterners behaved similarly; they were most generous toward their fellow co-regionals (mean= US\$ 5.6, 95% s.e. [0.2]), than towards westerners (mean= US\$ 4.8, 95% s.e. [0.4]).

Table 2 presents estimates of the in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination effects by regional identity. Comparisons between those residing in La Paz and Santa Cruz -Panel (a) and those residing in the highlands and lowlands -Panel (b) are insignificant. However, comparisons between those who feel strongly attached to their region are highly significant. Neither “collas” nor “cambas” awarded an in-group premium, but they impose a penalty to out-group members of around 0.54.

**Figure 2: Trust allocations by regional identities**



Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean allocations, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group allocations.

### 4.3. Income divides


*Rich vs. Poor.* Given the high levels of income inequality, we also analyze income or class divides between the “haves” and “have-nots”. We use two alternative definitions: 1) subjects income strata according to an unsupervised asset index constructed from survey responses about dwelling ownership status, access to services, and ownership of certain durables. Subjects in the two upper quantiles are classified as the haves, and those in the three lower quantiles are classified as have-nots; and 2) subjects self-identification into five income strata: low, middle-low, middle, middle-high, and high. Again, subjects in categories middle-high and high are classified as haves, and subjects in classes low, middle-low, and middle are classified as have-nots.

*Income Class stimuli.* We induce two different class identities, *haves* and *have-nots*. Player 2's categories were randomly chosen between two alternatives:

- ◆ Low socioeconomic strata
- ◆ High socioeconomic strata

*Results.* Figure 3 presents mean trust allocations to in-group and out-group members by socioeconomic status. Panel (a) analyzes differences between *have-nots* and *haves* defined by self-assessment of their economic condition. Panel (B) analyzes differences between *have-nots* and *haves* defined by an asset index constructed based on the ownership and access to services of the household dwelling, access to services, and access to household durables. By self-assessment of their socio-economic class, *have-nots* were more trusting of their fellow *have-nots* (mean=US\$ 6.4, s.e. [0.3]), and less trusting of their richer counterparts (mean=US\$ 4.9, s.e. [0.3]). On the contrary, *haves* were least generous toward other affluent people (mean=US\$ 5.5, s.e. [0.2]), and most generous with their poorer counterparts (mean=US\$6.0, s.e. [0.3]). By our asset index, *have-nots* were more trusting of fellow *have-nots* (mean=US\$ 5.7, s.e. [0.3]), and less trusting of their richer counterparts (mean=US\$ 5.0, s.e. [0.3]). On the other hand, *haves* were least generous toward other affluent people (mean=US\$ 5.3, s.e. [0.2]), and most generous with their poorer counterparts (mean=US\$ 6.5, s.e. [0.3]).

**Figure 3: Trust allocations by socioeconomic identity**



Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean allocations, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group allocations. The socioeconomic identity is based on participant self-assessment.

Table 3 presents estimates of the in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination effects by socioeconomic status. Interestingly, the out-group penalty from the have-nots toward the haves reversed to an out-group reward when we analyzed the transfers from the haves to the have-nots. Compared to the control experiment, the out-group awarded a bonus to have-nots of .74 -when defined by self-assessment and of .48 -when defined by the asset index; both were statistically significant. Compared to the control experiment, the out-group penalizes the haves with 0.46 -when defined by the asset index. But they award their fellow poor a bonus of 0.63 -when defined by self-assessment and a bonus of 0.47 -when defined by the asset index.

#### 4.3.1. Partisan divides

*Masistas vs. Pititas.* Finally, we explore partisan divisions according to past voting choices during the 2020 presidential election and today's voting preference toward current political leaders. We restrict both choices to the three main political parties and their leaders. Past voting preferences were: 1) Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), a left-wing political party -the incumbent. 2) Civic Community (CC), a centrist political coalition -in the Opposition. 3) We Believe (Creemos), a right-wing political alliance -in the Opposition.

Current voting preferences toward political leaders were: 1) Evo Morales, MAS's leader and former president of Bolivia during three consecutive terms from 2006 to 2019 -as representative of the incumbent political party. 2) Carlos Mesa, CC's leader (and former president of Bolivia from 2003-2005 -in the Opposition. 3) Luis Fernando Camacho, Creemos' leader and current Governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra -in the Opposition.


*Political identity stimuli.* Political affiliation was induced by revealing past voting choices during the 2020 presidential election and today's voting leanings toward political leaders.

*Results.* Figure 4 presents mean trust allocations by partisan identity to in-group and out-group members. Panel (a) analyzes differences between incumbent and opposition supporters by their 2020 voting preference, and panel (B) analyzes differences between incumbent and opposition supporters defined by current voting preferences.

Bolivians discriminate to a significant extent against opposing partisans in the trust game. The pattern of discrimination is not symmetric in that there is evidence of co-partisan favoritism. Prejudice against partisan opponents far exceeds in-group favoritism. By 2020 voting preferences, voters of the incumbent were more trusting of their co-partisans

(mean=US\$ 5.4, s.e. [0.5]), and less trusting of their counterparts in the Opposition (mean=US\$4.4, s.e. [0.4]). Opposition voters behaved similarly; they were most generous toward other opposition voters (mean=US\$ 5.4, s.e.[0.2]), and least generous with incumbent voters (mean=US\$ 3.3, s.e.[0.3]). Similarly, by current voting preferences, voters of the incumbent were more trusting of their co-partisans (mean=US\$ 5.9, s.e.[0.7]), and less trusting of their counterparts in the Opposition (mean=US\$ 4.7, s.e.[0.2]). Opposition voters behaved similarly; they were most generous toward other opposition voters (mean=US\$ 5.5, s.e. [0.2]), and least generous with incumbent voters (mean=US\$ 3.5, s.e. [0.3]).

**Figure 4: Trust allocations by partisan identities**



Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean allocations, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group allocations.

Table 4 presents estimates of the in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination effects by partisan identity. Compared with the control experiment, the out-group penalty to opposition partisans is .90 -when partisan identity is defined by 2020 voting preference and .97 -when partisan identity is defined by current voting preference; both are statistically significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. Compared to the control experiment, the out-group penalty to incumbent partisans is much higher, 1.73 -when partisan identity is defined by current voting preference, both statistically significant at 1%. At the same time, incumbent supporters awarded their fellow co-partisans a bonus of 0.75 -when partisan is defined by 2020 voting preference and a bonus of 1.40 -when defined by current voting preference. The partisan animus has become Bolivia's most dividing social identity compared to ethnic, regional, and socioeconomic divides.

#### **4.4. Self-declared affection measures**

To measure affection toward others within and between social identities, including political parties (a.k.a. affective polarization), we use a variation of the well-known feeling thermometer rating. The original feeling thermometer rating asks respondents to rate how warm (or cold) they feel toward their own and alternative social identities. Since “warm” and “cold” adjectives generated confusion among respondents during pilot tests<sup>2</sup>, we chose to ask respondents to rate how close (or far) they felt toward their own and alternative social identities. Specifically, respondents were asked to rate groups on a 101-point scale ranging from very close (0) to very far (100). To facilitate comparison without trust allocation measures, we rescale the affection measure from 0 (very close) to 1 (very far).

##### **4.4.1. Affection by ethnic identity**


Figure 5 presents affection ratings within and between ethnic identities. Panel (a) defines ethnic groups by heritage, Panel (b) defines ethnic groups by spoken languages, and Panel (c) defines ethnic groups by self-identification.

Compared to trust allocations, affection out-group bias is much more intense. Out-group bias toward non-indigenous (NI) is around 0.59 to 0.61 and statistically significant when language defines ethnicity. Out-group bias toward indigenous (I) is around 1.41 and 1.47 by heritage, around 1.66 and 1.65 by language, and around 2.24 and 2.23 by self-identification –depending on whether controls are excluded or included in the regression equation. These patterns of affection are asymmetrical. While non-indigenous receive a penalty as high as 9.5%, indigenous receive a 40.5% –more than four times larger than their counterparts receive (see Table 5).

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<sup>2</sup> Warm and cold adjectives are more commonly used to describe temperature rather than affection in Spanish.

**Figure 5: Affection ratings by ethnic identities**



Source: Author’s calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean affection ratings, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group ratings. Identification by heritage classifies a person as indigenous if he/she or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community. Identification is based on whether the participant speaks an indigenous language or not.


#### 4.4.2. Affection by regional identity

Figure 6 presents affection ratings within and between regional identities. Panel (a) defines regions by residence in the departments of La Paz and Santa Cruz; Panel (b) defines regions grouping departments in the highlands and the lowlands; and Panel (c) defines the regional social identity by self-identification.

Compare to trust allocations, affection out-group bias is more intense between regional groups. Out-group bias toward Easterners (E) is between 1.42 and 2.05, depending on the definition. All coefficients are statistically significant at 1%. Out-group bias toward Westerners (W) is between 0.58 and 1.75, depending on the definition used. Coefficients are robust to the inclusion of covariates. Again, these patterns of affection are asymmetrical using groupings

defined by place of residency –with a higher bias toward Easterners; but symmetrical when groupings are based on self-identification –Easterners receive a penalty as high as 26.2%; while Westerners receive a penalty as high as 22.4% (see Table 6).

**Figure 6: Affection ratings by regional identities**



Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean affection ratings, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group ratings.


#### 4.4.3. Affection by socioeconomic identity

Figure 7 presents affection ratings within and between socioeconomic identities. Panel (a) defines socioeconomic groups by self-assessment; Panel (b) defines socioeconomic classes using an asset index. One more time, compared to trust allocations, self-reported affection out-group bias is much more intense between socioeconomic classes. All coefficients are statistically significant. Depending on the definition, the out-group bias toward the haves (H) is between 0.56 and 1.19. Out-group bias toward the have-nots (HN) is between 0.27 and 0.36, depending on the definition used and is only significant for the self-assessment measure.



However, including covariates makes the coefficient statistically significant for the asset index classification. In other words, the haves receive a penalty of 12.4% and 24.2% under the self-assessment and asset-based measures. In contrast, the have-nots receive a penalty of only 5% and 4% under the self-assessment asset-based measures, respectively (see Table 7).

**Figure 7: Affection ratings by socioeconomic identities**




Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean affection ratings, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group ratings. The socioeconomic identity is based on participant self-assessment.

#### 4.4.4. Affection by partisan identity

Figure 8 presents affection ratings within and between socioeconomic identities. Panel (a) defines partisan groups by their 2020 voting preference; Panel (b) defines them by their current voting preference. Compared to trust allocations, self-reported affection out-group bias is more intense between partisan groups. Out-group bias toward the Opposition (O) is between 2.42 and 3.11, depending on whether we use 2019 or current voting preferences. Out-group bias toward the incumbents (I) is between 4.15 and 5.02, depending on whether we use 2019 or current voting preferences. All coefficients are statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of covariates. These patterns of self-reported affection are slightly asymmetrical. The Opposition receives a penalty of 66.7% and 75.1%, while the incumbents receive a penalty of only 73.3% and 78.5%, depending on the definition of a partisan group (see Table 8).

**Figure 8: Affection ratings by partisan identities**




Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean affection ratings, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval, and horizontal lines present the average in-group and out-group ratings.

To summarize our results until now, Figure 9 compares two alternative measures of social polarization: a behavioral polarization index, based on the mean difference between in-group and out-group bias in trust, and a self-reported polarization, based on the mean difference between in-group and out-group affection bias. The latter is higher than the first.

**Figure 9: Polarization index**



Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Diamonds represent the polarization scores for each identity and source. Ethnic identity identification by heritage classifies a person as indigenous if he/she or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community. Identification is based on whether the participant speaks an indigenous language or not. The socioeconomic identity is based on the participant's self-assessment. Behavioral stands for the computed polarization measures using a behavioral response score, while self-declared stands for a polarization index computed using a self-declared affection rating.


#### 4.5. Ideological polarization

What do partisans hate so much about their opponents? How likely is it that incumbents' and opponents' feelings are based entirely on policy disagreements? How much of the polarization between voters of opposing political parties can be explained by partisan-ideological sorting? Thus far, we have shown that partisan identities cause more considerable out-group reductions in trust and affect than historical, social identities related to ethnicity, region, or socioeconomic strata.

Figure 10 presents ideological positions concerning key policy issues to explore these issues. Panel (a) presents a mean policy agreement concerning socialism –in contrast to capitalism; Panel (b) presents a mean policy agreement concerning representative democracy –in contrast to participatory democracy; Panel (c) presents a mean policy agreement concerning the government responsible for providing jobs; Panel (d) presents mean policy agreement concerning government responsibility for supporting indigenous people; Panel (e) presents mean policy agreement in favor of gay marriage, and Panel (f) presents mean policy agreement in favor of legal abortion.

Table 10 presents estimates of the opposition difference –concerning the incumbents' average policy agreement on the six policy issues. Notice that the differences between the Opposition's and incumbents' average policies are not statistically significant on four of the six issues. The only significant disagreements arise concerning the government's responsibility for providing jobs and whether socialism was a better alternative to capitalism. There was no statistical difference between incumbent and opposition voters in all other critical issues, making it harder to explain antagonistic feelings purely on ideological grounds.

Figure 10: Ideological distance



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean ratings, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval. Partisan identity is based on the reported 2020 election vote, while ethnic identity is based on whether a person is or has a close relative who is part of an indigenous community. Regional identity uses the region of residence to identify Westerners (La Paz) and Easterners (Santa Cruz).

## 5. Conclusions

Trust in people is heavily influenced by the belief of who is and is not in their inner circle. People generally trust members of their group more than those outside of it. Understanding the groups responsible for causing this divide is vital for creating policies that build trust between individuals and institutions. This paper uses a survey experiment to measure in-group and out-group bias among historical and ascriptive social identities –defined by ethnicity, region of birth, and socioeconomic class, and among newly formed partisan identities –defined by voting preferences over political parties. We compare self-declared bias affection measures with behavioral trust allocations.

Partisan divisions currently overshadow ethnic, regional, and socioeconomic class cleavages in Bolivia; partisanship represents the dominant divide and the most substantial basis for group polarization. On a 1 to 10 scale, out-group ethnic bias is not statistically significant, regional out-group bias is symmetric and around 0.55, out/group bias toward the wealthy is around 0.46, while out-group bias toward opposition voters is between 0.90 and 0.97, and the out-group bias towards incumbents voters is between 1.42 and 1.73. We interpret these results as evidence that new partisanship has become a super-identity that concentrates various old unresolved cleavages and causes even more antagonistic feelings towards those with opposing voting preferences. Our results align with those of Great Britain, the United States, Belgium, and Spain (Westwood et al., 2015). They might be helpful to explain why political identities, such as Masista as a reference to the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia, or Chavista in Venezuela, or Bolsonarista in Brazil have become meaningful social identities created around political parties and their leaders and can even overshadow historical and structural cleavages based on ethnicity/race, region or socioeconomic strata.

We also find that surveys' self-report affection measures –the most commonly used measures of political polarization– overestimate the effect of social identities on behaviors. Affective polarization between groups is much higher than the out-group bias found in behavioral experiments.

We also find that polarization in trust (and affect) occurs only on the political party's core ideology and central platform: whether socialism or capitalism is a better path for a country's development. We did not find any statistically significant disagreements on all other policy

issues, such as the importance of representative democracy –in contrast to participatory democracy, government responsibility for providing jobs, government responsibility for supporting indigenous people, gay marriage, or the legalization of abortion.

We interpret these results as evidence that the new partisanship identities are now more critical than old social identities, such as those related to ethnicity, birthplace, and income. Partisan group dynamics have become tribal in nature, with members of each group fiercely loyal and biased against the other group, wanting their group to win at all costs. These changes are concerning because if political divisions become too intense, it could lead to rising societal anger and eroding democratic norms, driven more by the “otherness” of ideological opponents rather than issue-based disagreement. This could result in severe political polarization, which replaces positive-sum interests with zero-sum interests, reducing trust and willingness to cooperate and compromise and impeding collective action. Severe political polarization can also lead to problems of governance, where effective policy decisions cannot be made and implemented due to the inability to reach a consensus. In extreme political gridlocks, policies may have to be unilaterally imposed by the majority on the minority, which creates perceptions of the out-party as a threat to the way of life if they stay in power or come to power. In turn, this perception may create a tolerance for violations of the democratic norms and reinforce the perception of mutually exclusive identities in a vicious and pernicious feedback loop, where the “evil others” are consistently accused of frustrating *el pueblo*.

**Table 1**  
**Ethnic behavioral bias**

	(1)	Heritage (2)	(3)	(1)	Language (2)	(3)	(1)	Self-id (2)	(3)
From I to NI	-0.11	-0.07	-0.02	-0.21	-0.17	-0.06	-0.10	0.01	-0.32
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.21)
From NI to I	-0.68*	-0.61*	-0.02	-0.20	-0.13	0.28	-0.44	-0.31	-0.11
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.23)
From I to I	-0.26	-0.14	0.14	-0.73**	-0.59**	-0.20	-0.35	-0.20	-0.08
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.21)
Intercept	5.63***	5.67***	-0.15	5.64***	5.76***	-0.14	5.62***	5.66***	0.04
	(0.26)	(0.55)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.51)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.53)	(0.16)
R2	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00
Obs	711	706	705	711	706	705	711	706	705
Covariates	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Design	Between	Between	Mixed	Between	Between	Mixed	Between	Between	Mixed

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "I" stands for Indigenous, while "NI" for Non-Indigenous. Identification by heritage classifies a person as indigenous if he/she or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community. Identification based on language holds if the participant speaks any indigenous language.

**Table 2**  
**Regional behavioral bias**

	Lpz. vs Scz.			Low vs highlands			Self. id.		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
From W to E	0.20	0.23	0.06	0.10	0.16	-0.29	-0.63**	-0.59**	-0.53***
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.19)
From E to W	0.07	0.20	-0.18	0.22	0.40	-0.21	-0.86**	-0.88**	-0.55**
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.26)
From W to W	0.34	0.31	-0.14	0.13	0.18	-0.20	-0.08	0.01	-0.24
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.18)
Intercept	5.29***	5.43***	-0.07	5.28***	5.34***	0.08	5.65***	5.79***	0.13
	(0.14)	(0.49)	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.53)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.50)	(0.11)
R2	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.01
Obs	711	706	705	711	706	705	711	706	705
Covariates	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Design	Between	Between	Mixed	Between	Between	Mixed	Between	Between	Mixed

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "W" stands for West, while "E" for East. Lpz. and highlands are associated with the west, while Scz. and lowlands with the east.

**Table 3**  
**Socioeconomic behavioral bias**

	Self assessment			Assets index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
From HN to H	-0.62**	-0.64**	0.02	-0.79***	-0.77***	-0.46**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.19)
From H to HN	1.20***	1.21***	0.74***	0.49	0.51	0.48*
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.25)
From HN to HN	0.37	0.36	0.63**	0.96***	1.00***	0.47**
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.24)
Intercept	5.32***	5.46***	-0.25**	5.49***	5.52***	-0.02
	(0.16)	(0.51)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.52)	(0.13)
R2	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.03
Obs	706	701	704	706	701	704
Covariates	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Design	Between	Between	Mixed	Between	Between	Mixed

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "W" stands for West, while "E" for East. Lpz. and lowlands are associated with the west, while Scz. and highlands with the east.

**Table 4**  
**Partisan behavioral bias**

	2020 voting			Current voting		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
From I to O	-0.53	-0.63*	-0.90***	-0.16	-0.28	-0.97**
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.39)
From O to I	-1.71***	-1.78***	-1.73***	-1.30***	-1.26***	-1.42***
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.32)
From I to I	0.42	0.23	0.75*	1.13	0.86	1.40**
	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.45)	(0.72)	(0.74)	(0.62)
Intercept	4.96***	5.33***	-0.50***	4.81***	5.00***	-0.62***
	(0.14)	(0.54)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.54)	(0.11)
R2	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.04
Obs	704	699	701	704	699	701
Covariates	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Design	Between	Between	Mixed	Between	Between	Mixed

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "I" stands for Incumbent, while "O" for Opposition.



**Table 5**  
**Ethnic self-reported affection bias**

	Heritage		Language		Self-id	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<b>Affection towards NI</b>						
From I	-0.19 (0.21)	-0.16 (0.21)	-0.59*** (0.20)	-0.61*** (0.20)	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.18 (0.20)
Intercept	6.06*** (0.17)	6.24*** (0.50)	6.16*** (0.13)	6.42*** (0.47)	6.02*** (0.15)	6.22*** (0.48)
R2	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00
Obs	659	655	659	655	659	655
<b>Affection towards I</b>						
From NI	-1.41*** (0.23)	-1.47*** (0.23)	-1.66*** (0.22)	-1.65*** (0.22)	-2.24*** (0.21)	-2.23*** (0.21)
Intercept	5.95*** (0.13)	4.95*** (0.52)	6.48*** (0.17)	5.52*** (0.52)	6.40*** (0.13)	5.46*** (0.50)
R2	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.15
Obs	659	655	659	655	659	655
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "I" stands for Indigenous, while "NI" for Non-Indigenous. Identification by heritage classifies a person as indigenous if he/she or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community. Identification based on language holds if the participant speaks any indigenous language.

**Table 6**  
**Regional self-reported affection bias**

	Lpz. vs Scz.		Low vs highlands		Self. id.	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<b>Affection towards E</b>						
From W	-1.56*** (0.27)	-1.60*** (0.26)	-1.42*** (0.22)	-1.43*** (0.22)	-2.05*** (0.29)	-2.03*** (0.29)
Intercept	7.34*** (0.20)	6.75*** (0.61)	6.94*** (0.17)	6.38*** (0.54)	7.82*** (0.25)	6.56*** (0.67)
R2	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.12
Obs	408	405	660	656	428	426
<b>Affection towards W</b>						
From E	-0.86*** (0.27)	-0.85*** (0.27)	-0.58*** (0.22)	-0.57** (0.22)	-1.72*** (0.28)	-1.75*** (0.28)
Intercept	7.33*** (0.17)	6.77*** (0.61)	7.07*** (0.14)	6.57*** (0.52)	7.67*** (0.15)	7.48*** (0.63)
R2	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.09
Obs	409	406	661	657	429	427
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "W" stands for West, while "E" for East. Lpz. and lowlands are associated with the west, while Scz. and highlands with the east.

**Table 7**  
**Socioeconomic self-reported affection bias**

	Self-assessment		Assets index	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<b>Affection towards H</b>				
From HN	-0.56*** (0.21)	-0.54** (0.22)	-1.19*** (0.20)	-1.20*** (0.20)
Intercept	4.52*** (0.13)	5.17*** (0.50)	4.90*** (0.14)	5.74*** (0.49)
R2	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.05
Obs	660	656	660	656
<b>Affection towards HN</b>				
From H	-0.36* (0.22)	-0.44** (0.22)	-0.27 (0.21)	-0.35* (0.21)
Intercept	6.62*** (0.18)	5.34*** (0.50)	6.52*** (0.15)	5.21*** (0.49)
R2	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02
Obs	660	656	660	656
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "W" stands for West, while "E" for East. Lpz. and lowlands are associated with the west, while Scz. and highlands with the east.

**Table 8**  
**Partisan self-reported affection bias**

	2020 voting		Current voting	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<b>Affection towards O</b>				
From I	-2.42*** (0.22)	-2.39*** (0.22)	-3.11*** (0.28)	-3.09*** (0.29)
Intercept	3.63*** (0.12)	4.61*** (0.51)	4.14*** (0.13)	4.52*** (0.56)
R2	0.23	0.23	0.31	0.30
Obs.	404	402	278	277
<b>Affection towards I</b>				
From O	-4.15*** (0.27)	-4.08*** (0.27)	-5.02*** (0.33)	-4.89*** (0.34)
Intercept	5.66*** (0.23)	4.91*** (0.65)	6.39*** (0.29)	5.62*** (0.73)
R2	0.37	0.38	0.45	0.45
Obs.	405	403	279	278
Design	Between	Between	Between	Between

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: "I" stands for Incumbent, while "O" for Opposition.

**Table 9**  
**Social distance**

	Friends		Neighbors		Son/Daughter		Someone	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<b>2020 election</b>								
Opposition	1.08***	1.09***	1.13***	1.20***	1.48***	1.60***	1.39***	1.41***
	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Other	0.47*	0.66***	0.63**	0.78***	0.47*	0.61**	0.65***	0.77***
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Intercept	5.72***	5.57***	5.23***	4.85***	5.64***	5.92***	5.06***	5.68***
	(0.17)	(0.66)	(0.17)	(0.66)	(0.17)	(0.68)	(0.16)	(0.64)
R2	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05
Obs.	655	651	650	646	650	646	648	644
<b>Current voting</b>								
Opposition	0.75*	0.76*	0.94**	1.01**	1.25***	1.40***	1.07***	1.17***
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Other	0.31	0.42*	0.60**	0.69***	0.46*	0.56**	0.38	0.48**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Intercept	5.84***	5.61***	5.24***	4.80***	5.69***	5.90***	5.24***	5.74***
	(0.20)	(0.67)	(0.20)	(0.67)	(0.20)	(0.69)	(0.19)	(0.65)
R2	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03
Obs.	655	651	650	646	650	646	648	644
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: The column "Friends" explores how comfortable the subject feels with friends from another political party. The column "Neighbors" explores how comfortable the subject feels with Neighbors from another political party. The column "Son/Daughter" explores how comfortable the subject feels with a son or daughter from another political party. The column "Someone" explores how comfortable the subject feels with a someone from another political party.

**Table 10**  
**Ideology**

	Issue 1		Issue 2		Issue 3		Issue 4		Issue 5		Issue 6	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
<b>By 2020 election</b>												
Opposition	3.38***	3.17***	0.60	0.57	1.05**	0.87**	0.70**	0.70**	0.35	0.54	0.35	0.26
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.43)
Other	1.12***	1.00***	0.66**	0.66**	0.40	0.15	-0.01	-0.07	-0.25	-0.23	-0.08	-0.21
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.33)
Intercept	3.14***	2.27***	3.01***	2.79***	5.61***	4.43***	6.11***	5.50***	6.04***	7.90***	6.05***	7.46***
	(0.15)	(0.57)	(0.21)	(0.84)	(0.22)	(0.85)	(0.18)	(0.69)	(0.20)	(0.80)	(0.22)	(0.87)
R2	0.19	0.23	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.06
Obs.	639	635	644	640	642	638	641	637	641	637	640	636
<b>By current voting</b>												
Opposition	3.89***	3.71***	0.92*	0.98*	1.36**	1.19**	0.70	0.73	-0.09	0.17	-0.27	-0.25
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.53)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.54)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.56)	(0.56)
Other	1.09***	0.98***	0.47	0.46	0.14	-0.03	-0.00	-0.02	0.20	0.31	-0.17	-0.16
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Intercept	3.17***	2.22***	3.02***	2.78***	5.75***	4.51***	6.16***	5.52***	5.89***	7.73***	6.20***	7.49***
	(0.17)	(0.58)	(0.24)	(0.85)	(0.25)	(0.85)	(0.21)	(0.70)	(0.24)	(0.80)	(0.26)	(0.88)
R2	0.15	0.20	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.06
Obs.	639	635	644	640	642	638	641	637	641	637	640	636
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Issue (1) explores how much the subject agrees with socialism in contrast to capitalism. Issue (2) explores how much the subject agrees with representative democracy compared to participatory democracy. Issue (3) explores how much the subject agrees with the government providing everyone jobs and living standards. Issue (4) explores how much the subject agrees with the government aiding indigenous people. Issue (5) explores how much the subject agrees with legal gay marriage. Issue (6) explores how much the subject agrees with legal abortion.

*Fecha de recepción: 21 de mayo de 2024*  
*Fecha de aceptación: 28 de octubre de 2024*

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
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## Annexes

### A. Supporting materials

#### A.1. Figures




Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean allocations, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval and horizontal lines presents the average in-group and out-group allocations. Baseline tests for differences in in-group and out-group allocation based on color preferences.




**Figure 12: Allocation densities, baseline**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations were allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive. Baseline tests for differences in in-group and out-group allocation based on color preferences.


**Figure 13: Allocation densities by ethnic identity, identified by a spoken indigenous language**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations were allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive.


**Figure 14: Allocation densities by ethnic identity, identified by heritage**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations were allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive. Identification by heritage is based on whether the participant or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community.


**Figure 15: Allocation densities by ethnic identity, by self-identification**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations were allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive.


**Figure 16: Allocation densities by regional identity, by main administrative divisions**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations were allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive.


**Figure 17: Allocation densities by regional identity**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations were allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive.


**Figure 18: Allocation densities by socioeconomic identity**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations where allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive. Socioeconomic identity is based on participant's self-assessment.


**Figure 19: Allocation densities by partisan identity, based on current voting preference**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations where allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive.

**Figure 20: Allocation densities by partisan identity, based on reported 2020 election vote**



Source: Author's calculations based on the Survey Experiment.

Notes: Bars represents the density for the range of possible allocation, only integer allocations were allowed, from 0 to 10 inclusive.

## A.2. Tabulates

**Table 11**  
Trust allocation, base line

	Amount	std. err.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
<b>in-group</b>				
white-white	5.43	0.24	0.00	116
black-black	5.71	0.18	2.09	239
<b>out-group</b>				
black-white	5.43	0.18	4.74	253
white-black	5.20	0.27	0.93	108

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Baseline tests for differences in in-group and out-group allocation based on color preferences.

**Table 12**  
Trust allocation by ethnic identity

	Amount	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
By heritage	5.6	0.2	1.4	217
in-group	5.2	0.2	0.7	143
Non indigenous to Non indigenous	5.2	0.2	1.9	205
Indigenous to indigenous out-group	5.1	0.2	3.4	151
Non indigenous to indigenous	5.6	0.3	0.9	112
Indigenous to non-indigenous in-group	5.4	0.2	1.7	233
Non indigenous to Non indigenous	4.8	0.2	0.9	115
Indigenous to indigenous out-group	5.3	0.2	2.8	256
Non indigenous to indigenous	5.3	0.2	2.9	142
Indigenous to non indigenous in-group	5.4	0.2	1.0	207
Non indigenous to Non indigenous	4.9	0.2	2.1	141
Indigenous to indigenous out-group	5.4	0.2	1.8	226

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Identification by heritage classifies a person as indigenous if he/she or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community. Identification bases on whether the participant speaks any indigenous language or not.

**Table 13**  
Trust allocation by regional identity

	Amount	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
La Paz [west] vs Santa Cruz [east]	5.6	0.3	2.4	123
	5.4	0.3	0.0	85
	5.5	0.2	2.3	130
West to west	5.4	0.3	2.1	96
East to east out-group	5.4	0.2	1.9	212
West to east	5.3	0.2	1.5	137
East to west out-group	5.4	0.2	2.8	211
By self-identification in-group	5.5	0.2	1.3	151
West to west	5.6	0.2	1.2	168
East to east out-group	5.6	0.4	0.0	56
West to east	5.0	0.2	3.6	169
East to west	4.8	0.4	4.5	66

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Dots represent mean allocations, whiskers show their associated 95% confidence interval and horizontal lines presents the average in-group and out-group allocations.

**Table 14**  
**Trust allocation by socioeconomic stratum**

	Amount	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
Self-assessment	6.4	0.3	0.9	116
in-group	5.5	0.2	0.0	119
Have not to have not Have to have	4.9	0.3	2.5	122
out-group	6.0	0.3	4.7	106
Have not to have Have to have not	5.7	0.3	3.8	79
Assets index in-group	5.3	0.2	1.9	157
Have not to have not Have to have	5.0	0.3	0.0	84
out-group	6.5	0.2	2.1	143
Have not to have				
Have to have not				

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: The socioeconomic identity is based on participant self-assessment.

**Table 15**  
**Trust allocation by partisan identity**

	Amount	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
By 2020 election voting	5.4	0.5	5.6	36
In-group	5.4	0.2	3.4	206
Incumbent to incumbent Opposition to	4.4	0.4	14.8	88
opposition	3.3	0.3	26.0	96
Out-group	3.8	0.3	18.2	121
Incumbent to opposition Opposition to	4.8	0.2	5.2	286
incumbent Other to incumbent Other to	5.9	0.7	5.6	18
opposition	5.5	0.2	4.6	152
By current affiliation In-group	4.7	0.5	16.3	49
Incumbent to incumbent Opposition to	3.5	0.3	21.8	78
opposition	3.8	0.3	18.2	121
Out-group	4.8	0.2	5.2	286
Incumbent to opposition Opposition to				
incumbent Other to incumbent				
Other to opposition				

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: The category other represents those who does not report voting preference for any of the main parties or would rather not vote.

**Table 16**  
**Affect ratings by ethnic identity**

	Rating	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
By heritage	6.0	0.1	2.1	210
in-group	6.1	0.2	2.8	449
indigenous - indigenous	5.9	0.1	2.5	210
non indigenous - non indigenous out-group	4.5	0.2	7.3	449
indigenous - non indigenous non indigenous - indigenous	6.5	0.2	0.8	389
By spoken language in-group				
indigenous - indigenous	6.2	0.1	2.1	270
non indigenous - non indigenous out-group	5.6	0.2	3.3	389
indigenous - non indigenous non indigenous - indigenous	4.8	0.1	5.8	270
By self-identification in-group				
indigenous - indigenous	6.4	0.1	1.1	264
non indigenous - non indigenous out-group	6.0	0.1	2.6	395
indigenous - non indigenous	5.9	0.1	2.6	264
non indigenous - indigenous	4.2	0.2	8.0	395

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Identification by heritage classifies a person as indigenous if he/she or a close relative belongs to an indigenous community. Identification bases on whether the participant speaks any indigenous language or not.

**Table 17**  
**Affect ratings by regional identity**

	Amount	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
	6.5	0.2	2.5	172
La Paz [west] vs Santa Cruz [east]				
in-group	5.8	0.2	4.9	237
West to west East to east	7.3	0.2	0.4	172
out-group West to east East to west	7.3	0.2	1.2	237
Low lands [west] vs high lands [east] in-group	7.1	0.1	1.8	389
West to west East to east	6.9	0.2	1.9	272
out-group West to east East to west	5.5	0.1	5.8	389
By self-identification in-group				
West to west East to east	6.5	0.2	2.9	272
out-group West to east	6.5	0.2	2.5	172
East to west	5.8	0.2	4.9	237
	7.3	0.2	0.4	172
	7.3	0.2	1.2	237

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.



**Table 18**  
**Affect ratings by socioeconomic identities**

	Amount	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
Self-assessment	6.5	0.2	1.6	172
in-group	4.9	0.1	3.8	237
have nots - have nots have - have	3.7	0.2	10.3	172
out-group	6.3	0.1	0.9	237
have nots - have have - have nots	6.6	0.2	0.3	172
Assets index in-group	4.5	0.1	6.3	237
have nots - have nots have - have	4.0	0.2	7.3	172
out-group	6.3	0.1	1.8	237
have nots - have				
have - have nots				

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: The socioeconomic identity is based on participant self-assessment.

**Table 19**  
**Affect ratings by partisan identities, based on current vote preference**

	Rating	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
<b>in-group</b>				
incumbent to incumbent	63.9	3.8	2.7	60
opposition [cc] to opposition [cc]	51.7	1.8	3.4	165
opposition [cre] to opposition [cre]	60.7	4.2	5.6	54
opposition to opposition	41.4	1.3	3.6	54
<b>out-group</b>				
incumbent to opposition [cc]	11.5	2.3	41.9	59
incumbent to opposition [cre]	8.9	2.2	51.4	59
incumbent to opposition	10.2	2.1	39.2	59
opposition[cc] to incumbent	16.1	1.7	40.2	165
opposition[cre] to incumbent	6.6	1.9	48.6	54
opposition to incumbent	13.8	1.4	42.4	54
opposition[cc] to opposition[cre]	27.2	1.8	18.6	165
opposition[cre] to opposition[cc]	33.8	3.6	12.5	54
other to incumbent	31.4	1.4	23.0	389
other to opposition[cc]	27.0	1.2	19.8	387
other to opposition[cre]	20.4	1.2	31.0	386
other to opposition	23.7	1.1	15.7	387

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: the category other, represents those who does not report voting preference for any of the main parties or would rather not vote.

**Table 20**  
**Affect ratings by partisan identities, based on 2020 election vote**

	Rating	S.E.	Allocate 0 (%)	Sample size
<b>in-group</b>				
incumbent to incumbent	5.7	0.3	3.4	114
opposition [cc] to opposition [cc]	4.6	0.2	6.8	228
opposition [cre] to opposition [cre]	5.4	0.4	8.8	63
opposition to opposition	3.6	0.1	6.1	63
<b>out-group</b>				
incumbent to opposition [cc]	1.5	0.2	32.4	113
incumbent to opposition [cre]	0.9	0.2	46.9	113
incumbent to opposition	1.2	0.2	30.3	113
opposition [cc] to incumbent	1.7	0.2	38.9	228
opposition [cre] to incumbent	0.9	0.2	50.0	63
opposition to incumbent	1.5	0.1	41.4	63
opposition [cc] to opposition [cre]	2.5	0.2	23.9	228
opposition [cre] to opposition [cc]	2.7	0.3	20.0	63
other to incumbent	3.1	0.2	23.0	232
other to opposition [cc]	2.9	0.2	19.1	230
other to opposition [cre]	2.3	0.2	27.3	229
other to opposition	2.6	0.1	15.5	230

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: The category other represents those who does not report voting preference for any of the main parties or would rather not vote.

**Table 21**  
**Comfortably with peers with different political views**

	Incumbent	Opposition [cc]	Opposition [cre]	Other
Closeness to friend from another party	6.8	5.5	6.5	6.2
	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
By 2020 elections Rating	111	226	63	255
S.E.	6.6	5.7	6.1	6.1
Sample size	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
By current affiliation Rating	58	163	54	380
S.E.	6.4	5.1	5.9	5.9
Closeness to neighbors from another party by 2020 elections	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2
Rating S.E.	111	226	59	254
Sample size	6.2	5.1	5.6	5.8
By current affiliation Rating	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
S.E.	58	163	51	378
Sample size	7.1	5.6	5.9	6.1
Agrees with son/daughter from another party by 2020 elections	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2
Rating S.E.	111	226	59	254
Sample size	6.9	5.8	5.2	6.2
By current affiliation Rating	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2
S.E.	58	163	51	378
Sample size	6.4	5.0	5.1	5.7
Trust someone from another party by 2020 elections	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Rating S.E.	111	224	59	254
Sample size	6.3	5.3	4.9	5.6
By current affiliation Rating	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.1
S.E.	58	163	51	376
Sample size				

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Based on reported ratings derived from question [1g]. See questionnaire in Annex C.

**Table 22**  
**Agrees with direct democracy in contrast to participatory democracy**

	Rating	S.E.	Sample size
	3.6	0.2	262
	3.2	0.2	382
	.	0.2	439
By ethnic identity	3.0	0.2	205
Heritage Indigenous	3.5	0.2	386
Non indigenous Spoken language	3.2	0.2	258
Indigenous	3.6	0.2	232
Non indigenous Self identification	3.1	0.3	165
Indigenous	3.5	0.2	381
Non indigenous by regional identity	3.1	0.2	263
La Paz (west) vs Santacruz (east) West	3.5	0.2	308
East	3.1	0.3	112
High lands (west) vs Low lands (east) West	3.4	0.2	314
East	3.4	0.2	330
Self-identification (western vs eastern) West	3.8	0.3	314
East	3.2	0.2	330
By socioeconomic identity Self-assessment	3.6	0.3	110
Have nots Have	3.2	0.2	222
Assets index Have nots Have	2.3	0.4	59
By partisan identity	3.7	0.2	253
Based on 2020 election vote Incumbent	3.9	0.5	57
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre] Other	3.1	0.3	161
Based on current affiliation Incumbent	2.8	0.5	51
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre]	3.5	0.2	375
Other			

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Based on reported ratings derived from questions [1h to 6h]. See questionnaire in Annex C.

**Table 23**  
**Agrees with the government providing jobs and living standard**

	Rating	S.E.	Sample size
	6.5	0.2	261
	5.6	0.2	381
	6.1	0.2	438
By ethnic identity	5.6	0.3	204
Heritage Indigenous	6.1	0.2	385
Non indigenous Spoken language	5.7	0.2	257
Indigenous	5.6	0.2	230
Non indigenous Self-identification	6.1	0.3	165
Indigenous	5.7	0.2	379
Non indigenous by regional identity	6.3	0.2	263
La Paz (west) vs Santacruz (east) West	6.0	0.2	307
East	5.7	0.4	112
Self-identification (western vs eastern) West	6.5	0.2	314
East	5.4	0.2	328
By socioeconomic identity Self-assessment	6.5	0.2	314
Have nots Have	5.7	0.2	328
Assets index Have nots Have	6.7	0.3	109
By partisan identity	5.6	0.2	221
Based on 2020 election vote Incumbent	5.8	0.6	59
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre] Other	6.0	0.2	253
Based on current affiliation Incumbent	7.1	0.4	57
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre]	5.6	0.3	161
Other	6.4	0.6	51
	5.9	0.2	373

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Based on reported ratings derived from questions [1h to 6h]. See questionnaire in Annex C.

**Table 24**  
**Agrees with the government aiding indigenous people**

	Rating	S.E.	Sample size
	6.8	0.2	261
	5.9	0.2	380
	6.3	0.1	438
By ethnic identity	6.1	0.2	203
Heritage Indigenous	6.5	0.2	385
Non indigenous Spoken language	5.8	0.2	256
Indigenous	5.7	0.2	229
Non indigenous Self-identification	6.9	0.2	165
Indigenous	6.0	0.2	378
Non indigenous By regional identity	6.5	0.2	263
La Paz (west) vs Santacruz (east) West	6.2	0.2	307
East	6.9	0.3	112
High lands (west) vs Low lands (east) West	6.8	0.2	314
East	5.7	0.2	327
Self-identification (western vs eastern) West	6.6	0.2	314
East	6.0	0.1	327
By socioeconomic identity Self-assessment	6.8	0.3	109
Have nots Have	5.9	0.2	221
Assets index Have nots Have	6.9	0.4	59
By partisan identity	6.1	0.2	252
Based on 2020 election vote Incumbent	6.9	0.4	57
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre] Other	6.0	0.2	161
Based on current affiliation Incumbent	6.8	0.4	51
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre]	6.2	0.2	372
Other			

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Based on reported ratings derived from questions [1h to 6h]. See questionnaire in Annex C.

**Table 25**  
**Agrees with legal gay marriage**

	Rating	S.E.	Sample size
	5.8	0.2	261
	6.2	0.2	380
	6.0	0.2	438
By ethnic identity	5.9	0.2	203
Heritage Indigenous	6.0	0.2	385
Non indigenous Spoken language	6.0	0.2	256
Indigenous	6.1	0.2	229
Non indigenous Self identification	6.1	0.3	165
Indigenous	6.1	0.2	378
Non indigenous By regional identity	6.1	0.2	263
La Paz (west) vs Santacruz (east) West	6.1	0.2	307
East	6.2	0.3	112
High lands (west) vs Low lands (east) West	5.9	0.2	314
East	6.1	0.2	327
Self-identification (western vs eastern) West	5.3	0.2	314
East	6.4	0.2	327
By socioeconomic identity Self- assessment	6.4	0.3	109
Have nots Have	6.0	0.2	221
Assets index Have nots Have	6.2	0.4	59
By partisan identity	5.8	0.2	252
Based on 2020 election vote Incumbent	5.8	0.5	57
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre] Other	6.0	0.3	161
Based on current affiliation Incumbent	5.4	0.5	51
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre]	6.1	0.2	372
Other			

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Based on reported ratings derived from questions [1h to 6h]. See questionnaire in Annex C.

**Table 26**  
**Agrees with legal abortion**

	Rating	S.E.	Sample size
	6.1	0.2	260
	6.0	0.2	380
	6.2	0.2	437
By ethnic identity	5.8	0.3	203
Heritage Indigenous	6.2	0.2	384
Non indigenous Spoken language	5.8	0.2	256
Indigenous	6.5	0.2	228
Non indigenous Self identification	5.6	0.3	165
Indigenous	6.3	0.2	377
Non indigenous By regional identity	5.8	0.2	263
La Paz (west) vs Santacruz (east) West	6.4	0.2	307
East	5.2	0.4	112
High lands (west) vs Low lands (east) West	5.9	0.2	314
East	6.3	0.2	326
Self-identification (western vs eastern) West	5.5	0.3	314
East	6.3	0.2	326
By socioeconomic identity Self-assessment	6.4	0.3	109
Have nots Have	6.1	0.3	221
Assets index Have nots Have	5.7	0.6	59
By partisan identity	6.0	0.2	251
Based on 2020 election vote Incumbent	5.9	0.5	57
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre] Other	6.5	0.3	161
Based on current affiliation Incumbent	5.2	0.6	51
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre]	6.0	0.2	371
Other			

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Based on reported ratings derived from questions [1h to 6h]. See questionnaire in Annex C.



**Table 27**  
**Agrees with socialism in contrast to capitalism**

	Rating	S.E.	Sample size
	4.5	0.2	260
	3.9	0.1	379
	4.4	0.1	437
By ethnic identity	3.6	0.2	202
Heritage Indigenous	4.5	0.1	384
Non indigenous Spoken language	3.7	0.2	255
Indigenous	4.6	0.2	228
Non indigenous Self identification	3.5	0.2	164
Indigenous	4.5	0.1	377
Non indigenous By regional identity	3.7	0.2	262
La Paz (west) vs Santacruz (east) West	4.6	0.2	307
East	2.9	0.3	111
High lands (west) vs Low lands (east) West	4.4	0.2	314
East	3.9	0.1	325
Self-identification (western vs eastern) West	4.4	0.2	314
East	4.0	0.1	325
By socioeconomic identity Self-assessment	6.5	0.2	109
Have nots Have	3.2	0.2	221
Assets index Have nots Have	2.9	0.3	59
By partisan identity	4.3	0.1	250
Based on 2020 election vote Incumbent	7.1	0.4	57
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre] Other	3.4	0.2	161
Based on current affiliation Incumbent	2.3	0.3	51
Opposition [cc] Opposition [cre]	4.3	0.1	370
Other			

Source: Author's calculations based on the survey experiment.

Notes: Based on reported ratings derived from questions [1h to 6h]. See questionnaire in Annex C.

## **B. Trust Game**

### **B.1. Instructions**

This game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 and a Player 2. Each of you will play this game with a randomly assigned anonymous person who is also participating in this study. We will give 10 tokens to Player 1. Player 1 then has the opportunity to give a portion of his or her tokens to Player 2. Player one could give some, all, or none of the 10 tokens. Whatever amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 will be tripled before it is passed on to Payer 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of this tripled amount to Player 1.

We will give you information about Player 2, but will not tell you who the player is. Player 2 will see the same set of information about you.

Then the game is over. Player 1 receives whatever he or she kept from their original 10 tokens, plus anything returned to him or her by Player 2. Player 2 receives their original 10 tokens, plus whatever was given to him or her by Player 1, and then tripled minus whatever they returned to Player 1.

You will play this game five times, with five different people.

The more tokens you obtain, the more chances you will have to obtain one of the prizes.

#### **B.1.1. Example 1**

Imagine that Player 1 gives 4 tokens to Player 2. We trope this amount, so Player 2 gets 12 tokens (3 times 4 tokens equals 12 tokens). At this point, Player 1 has 6 tokens and Player 2 has 12 tokens. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give anything back to Player 1, and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return 3 tokens to Player 1. At the end of the game Player, 1 will have 9 tokens and Player 2 will have 9 tokens.

#### **B.1.2. Example 2**

Imagine that Player 1 gives 3 tokens to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets 9 tokens (3 times 3 tokens equals 9 tokens). At this point, Player 1 has 7 tokens and Player 2 has 9 tokens. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give anything back to Player 1 and if so, how

much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return 0 tokens to Player 1. At the end of the game Player, 1 will have 7 tokens and Player 2 will have 9 tokens.

### **B.1.3. Example 3**

Imagine that Player 1 gives 10 tokens to Player 2. We triple this amount, so Player 2 gets 30 tokens (3 times 10 tokens equals 30 tokens). At this point, Player 1 has 0 tokens and Player 2 has 30 tokens. Then Player 2 has to decide whether to give anything back to Player 1 and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return 3 tokens to Player 1. At the end of the game Player, 1 will have 3 tokens and Player 2 will have 27 tokens.

## **C. Survey**

### **a. General Information**

- 1a. Names:
- 2a. Last Names:
- 3a. Age:
- 4a. City of birth:
- 5a. Department of birth:
- 6a. Department if residence:
- 7a. The neighborhood of residence:
- 8a. Department of residence:
- 9a. Favorite color between white and black:

### **b. Highest level of education**

- 1b. Did you graduate from high school?
  - i. Yes, public.
  - ii. Yes, private.
  - iii. Not graduated yet, but I attend a public school with regularity.
  - iv. Not graduated yet, but I attend a private school with regularity.
  - v. Never attend school.

2b. What is the highest level of education of your mother?

3b. What is the highest level of education of your father?

4b. What is the main occupation of your mother?

5b. What is the main occupation of your father?

### **c. Ethnic affiliation**

1c. Did you or any of your family members (parents or grandparents) speak an indigenous language?

- i. yes.
- ii. no.

2c. Do you or any of your family members (parents or grandparents) were born or belong to an indigenous community?

- i. yes.
- ii. no.

3c. Do you consider yourself indigenous?

- i. yes.
- ii. no.

4c. With which of the following Bolivian identities do you identify yourself the most?

- i. Camba.
- ii. Colla.
- iii. None/Other.

### **d. Income and wealth**

1d. According to you, approximately ¿To which socioeconomic strata does your household belong?

- i. Lowest strata
- ii. Middle-low strata
- iii. Middle strata
- iv. Middle-high strata
- v. Highest strata

2d. Which of the following best describes the accommodation where you and your family currently live?

- i. Own house
- ii. Rented house
- iii. Rent-free

3d. Number of people in household?

4d. Does your household have a broadband Internet connection?

- i. yes
- ii. no

5d. Which of the followingg does your household have?

- |  |         |        |
|--|---------|--------|
| i. Microwave:                                  | yes [ ] | no [ ] |
| ii. PC/Broadband connection                    | yes [ ] | no [ ] |
| iii. PC/Cable-TV service                       | yes [ ] | no [ ] |
| iv. Streaming services (e.g. Netflix, Spotify) | yes [ ] | no [ ] |
| v. Washing machine                             | yes [ ] | no [ ] |
| vi. Auto                                       | yes [ ] | no [ ] |

### e. Political Affiliation

1e. In a scale from left to right. Which of the following best describe your political preferences?

- i. Far left-wing.
- ii. Left-wing.
- iii. Center.
- iv. Right-wing.
- v. Far right-wing.

2e. In the last election, who did you vote for?

- i. MAS.
- ii. CC.
- iii. Creemos.
- iv. None/Other.

3e. Which political party is more closely aligned with your current political preferences?

- i. MAS.
- ii. CC.
- iii. Creemos.
- iv. None/Other.

4e. If we would have elections today, who would you vote for?

- i. Evo Morales.
- ii. Carlos Mesa.
- iii. Luis Fernando Camacho.
- iv. None/Other.

**f. Affective Polarization**

1f. On a scale from 0 to 100, how cold [0] or warm [100] do you feel toward?

- i. MAS [ ]
- ii. CC [ ]
- iii. Creemos [ ]

2f. On a scale from 0 to 100, how cold [0] or warm [100] do you feel toward?

- i. Evo Morales [ ]
- ii. Carlos Mesa [ ]
- iii. Luis Fernando Camacho [ ]

3f. On a scale from 0 to 100, how cold [0] or warm [100] do you feel toward?

- i. Socialists [ ]
- ii. Capitalists [ ]
- iii. Working/Campesino class [ ]
- iv. Business owners [ ]
- v. Indigenous [ ]
- vi. Non indigenous [ ]

4f. What feelings describe how things are going in our country?

- i. Hopeful/Hopeless
- ii. Calm/Angry
- iii. Happy/Sad

- iv. Proud/Sorry
- v. Safe/Afraid
- vi. Confident/Nervous
- vii. Calm/Worried

### **g. Social distance**

1g. On a scale from 0 to 100...

- i. How comfortable are you having close friends from the other party? [ ]
- ii. How comfortable are you having neighbors from the other party? [ ]
- iii. How comfortable are you if your (future) children will marry someone from the other party? [ ]
- iv. How much would you trust someone from the other party? [ ]

### **h. Ideological distance**

1h. In a scale from [-10] to [+10], which score best describes your opinion? Given that...

[-10] Citizens should actively participate in each and every important decision about the country. [0] Neutral.

[+10] Citizens should vote for their representative and let them be in charge of each and every important decision about the country.

2h. In a scale from [-10] to [+10], which score best describes your opinion? Given that...

[-10] Government should guarantee jobs and standard of living to everyone.

[0] Neutral.

[+10] Government should let each person get ahead on their own.

3h. In a scale from [-10] to [+10], which score best describes your opinion? Given that...

[-10] Government should at least provide education, health, and social insurance to everyone. [0] Neutral.

[+10] Everyone should buy his own education, health, and insurance.

4h. In a scale from [-10] to [+10], which score best describes your opinion? Given that...

[-10] Government should help indigenous people.

[0] Neutral.

[+10] Indigenous people should help themselves.

5h. In a scale from [-10] to [+10], which score best describes your opinion? Given that...

[-10] Gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to legally marry.

[0] Neutral.

[+10] There should be no legal recognition of gay or lesbian couples relationship.

6h. In a scale from [-10] to [+10], which score best describes your opinion? Given that...

[-10] By law, abortion should never be permitted.

[0] Neutral.

[+10] By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

7h. How often did you participate in political meetings, rallies, speeches, fundraisers, or things like that in support of your party (Single choice matrix)

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Frequently	Usually
i. During the 2019 conflicts?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ii. During the 2020 election?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
iii. During the last year?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

8h. How often do you pay attention to what is going on in government and politics? (Single choice options row)

- i. Always.
- ii. Most of the time
- iii. About half of the time
- iv. Some of the time
- v. Never

9h. How well do you understand the important political issues facing our country? (Single choice options row)

- i. Extremely well.
- ii. Very well.
- iii. Moderately well.
- iv. Slightly well.
- v. Not well at all.



10h. On average, how many hours a day do you expend using...?

- i. Facebook [ ]
- ii. Whatsapp [ ]
- iii. Instagram [ ]
- iv. Twitter [ ]
- v. YouTube [ ]
- vi. Tiktok [ ]